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This title is a plagiarism of that of a lecture by J acques Maritain in Prince-
ton, 1951. It occurred not now but in 1990 when I wanted to take the floor 
at the general meeting of the Federation of Hungarian Architects. It would 
have begun somehow like that: 'The Federation of Hungarian Artists and 
Applied Artists entitled me to speak at this general meeting, as represen-
tative of a trade humiliated and self-humiliating, or, more rudely, dishon-
oured, and self-dishonouring. But it seems to me I am speaking to a trade 
that can make these attributes to refer to itself.' I did not take the floor, 
since - just as at the general meeting of artists not long ago, concerned 
only with agreeing the new statutes, problems of election of officials - here 
the problem of 'Chamber' was focused on. Questions like the situation of 
our architecture and fine arts, existence or not of viable tendencies, what 
is the architectural and artistic culture in this country at all, and if it is 
execrable - it is so - who is responsible for it, how much creative artists 
are responsible for it; may some aspects of value be spoken of? Whether 
the architect is responsible or not for having served wrong decisions, hav-
ing taken part in demolishing historical town cores, being ready to design 
pseudo-symbol buildings or trashy villas and holiday homes for the newly 
rich? By analogy: do hydraulic engineering experts offering all their pro-
fessional skill the Bos-N agymaros plans, and architect teams ready to its 
aesthetic-architectural plastic surgery merit condemnation? 
These rhetorical questions may be also asked in the field of fine arts, 
but here the real facts of hurling down statues swept away merely theoreth-
ical interrogatories. Let us refer to the oeuvre of Imre Varga, the sculptor 
1 Delivered at the Budapest Technical University. Institute of the History and Theory of 
Architecture, on the 13th of December, 1990, on the occasion of the commemorative cel-
ebration and conference entitled 'Tradition and Intuition' 
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among the most skilled ones in this country, and the most successful one 
in the last a quarter of the century. 
If invited, he modelled Our Lady, divine and mother, the devout St. 
Elizabeth, St. Stephen shaken by the task inflicted on him by his vocation, 
Radnoti meditating even on the pathway to death, Derkovits defying mer-
ciless reality, the stately Mihaly Karolyi, Wallenberg shouldering anything 
for humanism, a tired Lenin like any other, Bela Kun swaggering, Liszt, the 
mad genius, Bartok fluttering, the quiet Kodaly, the Holocaust monument: 
he did model anything ordered either by Gyorgy Aczel, or by Cardinal 
Lekai, and said with the coolness of a professional: 'give me the lion', mon-
ument of Imre N agy too. When asked, how to feel like Virgin Mary and 
Lenin at the same time, how to serve several gods at the same time, he did 
not understand the question, since he is a professional who is expected only 
to solve the given problem to his best. Neither Zsigmond Kisfaludy-Strobl 
did bother whether modelling the monument of Istvan Horty or the Statue 
of Liberation. Can a sculptor help it if he has to model Caesar rather than 
Pericles? Can an architect help it if he has to design a Forum for Mussolini 
rather than a cathedral? 
In these rhetorical questions - which I did not dare to raise at the 
general meeting - doubtless, several problems are interlaced that have to 
be attempted to be disentangled to get back to the origin, the question 
without a question mark: responsibility of the architect. 
According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, responsibility is 
moral, legal or mental accountability. Thereby it may be also a legal term, 
but also a moral quality - obviously, for us, this latter is of interest. "\Vhat 
is the responsibility of the creative artist - architect, fine artist - to whom 
or to what is he responsible? 
Maritain, in his quoted lecture, discussed primarily the writer's re-
sponsibility, polemically starting from Gide's statement: 'What was writ-
ten by somebody has no significance or consequence.' His reasoning affects, 
however, other branches of arts, too, being concerned with the relation 
between arts and morals. In his opinion, there is no direct relation be-
tween these two scopes arising from inner subordination, since both are 
autonomous regions of the human cultural sphere, hence 'controlled from 
inside', with individual value criteria. Art is a virtue in Aristotle's and 
St.Thomas Aquinas' meanings, that is, an ability to create value, a cre-
ative force - like the ability of 'Practical Reason' - referring to the act 
of producing an object, serving the oeuvre's 'good', 'benefit' - in Mari-
tain's wording, 'bien de l'oeuvre' - rather than human purposes (bien de 
l'homme). The value displayed in the work is not the human will but 
it arises from the thing itself, as its display. Thus, the creative artist is 
primarily responsible to the work producing a value by its disclosure, its 
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coming to being, hence to art itself. His duty is to develop this value wish-
ing to be born. He has to concentrate on it, and sacrifice anything for that. 
His individual morals are subordinate. Oscar Wilde was right to tell: 'That 
somebody is a poisoner is no argument against his prose.', or as Cocteau 
stated: 'Painting does not care a hoot if the painter is damned, if hell's fire 
anneals the stained glass window to sparkling.' But, in Maritain'opinion, 
this is by no means the same for the painter, since he is not the creature 
of Painting, and not a mere painter, but primarily a human being, and 
as such, subject to moral principles. From the aspect of Art, the artist 
is, in fact, responsible only to his work, but from the aspect of Morals, 
Gide's statement is a self-deceit, since the writer, the artist does respond 
to his, and his neighbour moral requirements. As a matter of fact, Arts 
and Morals are two autonomous independent worlds, but remember that 
both are worlds of man, that is, man as an intellectual creative and moral 
being is performer of facts determinant for his fate, sharing both worlds. 
Since, however, man is primarily a man rather than a writer or a painter, 
from human aspects, the autonomous world of Morals, the issuing system 
of requirements is superior to the autonomous world of Arts. There can be 
such a law that contradicts the categorical imperative of Moral, concerned 
with the gist of human existence: human salvation. In other words: in final 
account, Art is indirectly, extrinsically subordinate to Moral. Thus, Mari-
tain, in conformity with his Catholic ethos, unambiguously voted for 'bien 
de l'homme' although stressing the relative value of the 'bien de l'oeuvre'. 
How can all these be interpreted from the aspect of architecture and 
fine arts? In architecture and in fine arts of community function, what 
is the customer determinant, either a some social community or an indi-
vidual. Namely, function, ideological, iconological message, symbolism of 
the object are not inventions of the creator alone but also of the customer, 
and even the style is selected else than by the creator's pure decision. Let 
us quote again the statement of the outstanding philosopher Nicolai Hart-
mann. '... a house, even an unimportant one, a failure of a house is 
related to the restricted family as the clothing is to the personality: ex-
pression of self-concept and conscious self-modelling. Hence even a living 
house points to essential features of man. While an enormous building 
demonstrates what is set by his ideas as a goal for him, thus, what man 
wants to become, what he dreams of.' Accordingly, also the community, 
the customer are responsible - but in fact, does it exonerate the architect 
or artist working on commission of the community, or are they only re-
sponsible as professionals, hence, does the responsibility for the 'bien de 
l'oeuvre' in their field actually have the priority? 
All these point to the complexity of the problem of responsibility 
in architecture and in fine arts. The simplest may be the domain of au-
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tonomous morals, the 'bien de l'homme', namely that general moral norms, 
civic and professional uprightness, honour hold also for those active in these 
fields. That in this respect, the artistic and architectural institutionalism 
and customary law are 'poachy' needn't be confirmed. 
It is well known that there is an infinity of rotten interlacings: profes-
sional lobbying; corruption possibilities arising from antagonism between 
design and construction: from being at the mercy of the building industry: 
group interests controlling acceptance or refusal of designs: or often, man-
ifest mafia - as an 'excuse' it may be mentioned that neither the western 
countries more correct, morally higher, much superior to us. This, however, 
belongs to general ethical norms such as if a shopkeeper cheats or not his 
customers. 
I am of the view that the kind of work undertaken by somebody 
belongs to individual moral standards. Quoting the former example: it has 
to do with someone's conscience not to have anything against modelling 
both Janos Kadar and Imre N agy. 
In the matter of architecture: for the designer it is indifferent what is 
the ideology and function of the building undertaken to be designed, and he 
does his best to meet a maybe deeply antihuman task, assuming absolute 
break, alienation between 'bien de l'oeuvre' and 'bien de l'homme'. As a 
matter of fact, the endeavour to aesthetic perfection may be even confessed 
by a whore, also killer tools may be subject to design: a well-designed rocket 
may be as beautiful as Brancusi's bird. 
There is an infinity of examples for problems concerned with individ-
ual or communal moral shifting under the competence of professional ethic 
norms. 
It would be difficult to concisely define the purport of professional 
ethics, intermingling responsibilities for, and obligations to 'bien de l'homme' 
and 'bien de l'oeuvre'. For instance, the boundary between general moral 
and professional ethic responsibility was faded out in a case like that of the 
scandal of the pavilion of Sevilla where decision of the legal jury was kicked 
over by the administration, and an outstanding architect earlier denying 
to take part at the competition became accomplice to the antidemocratic 
decision. There is an infinity of examples for similar cases in other fields of 
culture -let us simply refer to that after the politically motivated dismissal 
of the chief editors of literary and sociographic reviews Mozg6 Vilag and 
Tiszataj, some were immediately ready to replace them. In these examples, 
however, general moral problems are determinant. 
The situation is more difficult in problems of professional ethics de-
cided by commitment to 'bien de l'oeuvre' rather than to 'bien de l'homme'. 
Namely, in such cases it is difficult to decide if someone fails in an archi-
tectural problem, - hence in the 'bien de l'oeuvre' - since the problem 
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is beyond him, being simply talentless, or the customer was dilettantish 
but insistent by forcing the designer to accept poor compromises. A num-
ber of cases may be quoted where it is difficult to decide whether it is a 
professional shortcoming or an offence against professional ethics. There 
are several public buildings where difference between the function of the 
entrance hall and distributional function of the vestibule of an office build-
ing has been omitted caring little for such blunders like that of having 
designed on one of the most representative squares of Budapest, near the 
Gresham palace, the 'Hungarian Sing-Sing' as tourists from abroad name 
it; spoiling the sight of the Basilica dome by the 'mini-dome' of a building 
of obscure style: accommodating the bar of the fitness hall in the architec-
turally accented hotel division floor facing the most beautiful panorama in 
this country (Chain Bridge, Buda Castle) to quote some examples of ar-
chitectural mistakes. All these may be, of course, due to a common mistake 
of customer and architect, or may point to professional deficiencies of sev-
eral of our architects. For instance, there are many unaware of that a flight 
of stairs is a space forming factor with iconological meaning. Indulgently 
speaking, it may be an other than professional ethic offence, or only in that 
meaning that the architect shouldered a problem beyond his abilities. But 
looking at the Buda hills, the Balaton region, and several Transdanubian 
towns, with their trashy villas of a peculiar style mixing the 'Baumeister' 
style of the '60s with forms of the Makovecz school and of post-modern 
Eclecticism, - outrage against the principle of organic architecture, - then 
it is righteous to say that designers of this 'tinder architecture' may be 
sentenced because of offence of professional ethics. 
Adolf Loss qualifying ornament a crime did not express only the sec-
tarian purism and aggressive denial of the past of the developing rationalist 
architecture but - in spite of his exaggeration-borne mistake - he guessed 
architectural creation to be a kind of ethic act. In fact, the cynism 'all 
is the same for me' is a professional ethic offence. Namely, for the case 
of architecture, in conformity just to those in the quotation from Hartm-
nan, - in addition to Maritain's requirements of 'bien de l' oeuvre'and 
'bien de l'homme', a third requirement has to be established: 'bien de la 
communaute', that is, responsibility to the community, - and in this re-
spect, 'community' means more than the actual society, namely, it is at the 
same time responsibility for past and future, for the safeguarding harmonic 
symbiosis of human society and Nature. Conservation of the architectural 
culture of mankind, making it a public property and developing it, modesty 
with creations of the past - an obligation even if just the tradition has to 
be transcended - is a professional ethic norm just as it is indecency for an 
architect to transform the Sandor Palace to a gambling casino, to design a 
hotel on the slope of the Buda Castle Hill, to face-lift Bos-Nagymaros, to 
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deface the Buda hills with trashy villas of the newly rich, to irresponsibly 
reconstruct historical monuments, to help barbarous destruction of histori-
cal town districts, or to disregard them because also natural environment is 
an inalienable part of national culture, forming identity, habits of a people, 
so it must not be outraged by the architect. 
These were about to be told in my speech at the general meeting, but 
I understood that the matter of the 'Chamber' was of utmost importance, 
just as the situation of our architects under 'unfolding market conditions'. 
